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I. INTRODUCTION

People in favor of capital punishment advocate the institution for
one or more of the following reasons: they believe the threat of capital punishment will deter murder better than the threat of life imprisonment; capital punishment is justified because it undeniably
prevents further crimes by those executed-in other words, it is a
perfect means of incapacitation; capital punishment is just because
all, or at least particular subcategories of, murderers deserve the
death penalty; and capital punishment saves the state money by executing murderers rather than imprisoning them for the rest of their
lives.
Opponents of capital punishment attack each of these reasons.
*Jackson Eli Reynolds Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1954,
Harvard University.
This is the third in a series of papers on capital punishment, which the author hopes will
eventually be integrated into a book on the topic. The first article appeared in the 1983 University of Illinois Law Review 555, on the utilitarian and moral case for capital punishment. The
second article appeared in 11 Florida State University Law Review 369 (1983), on evidentiary
aspects of capital punishment litigation. This paper is on the problems of administering capital
punishment.
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They claim that the death penalty does not deter murder any more
than does life imprisonment; it is not used, and should not be used,
to prevent further crimes by those who have already killed; it is unjust; and rather than being cheaper than life imprisonment, it is more
expensive.
Opponents of the death penalty will further respond that even if
the reasons for capital punishment are valid, they are nonetheless
overridden by arguments against the practice. Opponents may contend that the state should not claim the right to kill its own citizens.
Once the state claims this right, it eventually may find itself executing not only murderers but also thieves, currency speculators and,
indeed, those deemed disloyal to the state.1 In addition, opponents
will assert that capital punishment, by its very nature, will have to be
arbitrarily, unequally, and discriminatorily applied. Moreover, since
no human process is infallible, capital punishment will inevitably result in the execution of innocent people. Finally, opponents argue
that the death penalty is a kind of torture-killing which the state
should be above on moral, or even aesthetic, grounds.
Though hints of the opponents' arguments will appear in various
forms in this article, I will not discuss them as arguments against the
institution of capital punishment. Instead, my focus is on their effect
on the issue I will address: the problem of administering capital
punishment.

II. MERIT PAY

FOR TEACHERS

Perhaps a meaningful way to consider the problems of administering capital punishment is to think about an entirely different
problem-one that has been debated actively in Florida. The issue is
merit pay for teachers. We begin with the fact that most people,
apart from teachers and their union representatives, agree that merit
pay for teachers is a very good idea. On utilitarian grounds, we want
to give an incentive for all teachers to become better ones; on moral
grounds, we want to do justice by rewarding those who are doing a
good job. The problem is in figuring out a means of administration-in other words, a method of selecting out deserving good teachers from those who are undeserving. Under the Florida proposal,
teachers who have taught for four years, two in Florida, hold a
Master's degree in their field, have no more than eighteen absences
1. This is exactly the situation found today in the Soviet Union. Law on Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State, arts. 24, 25 (IV COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR
AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPULICS PQ VII-8 (W.E. Butler trans. 1983)); see also A. SAKHARoV,
ALARM AND HOPE 122 (1978) (suggesting that "several hundred" executions take place each year
in the Soviet Union).
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over the past two years, and make a certain score on a national
teacher's exam in their subject are eligible for merit pay.
Clearly, there is one big problem in Florida's means of evaluation.
Virtually none of the criteria bears more than a peripheral relation to
being a good teacher. Doing well on an examination in the subject
matter taught may be relevant for chemistry and foreign language
teachers. After attaining a certain level of competence in the subject,
presumably reached by most who assay the task, it is probably by no
means the most important factor. For elementary school teachers,
test performance probably has only the weakest correlation with
teaching ability. At the very least, there is no demonstrable connection between what they are measuring and the determination they
are trying to make.
The reason, of course, is that it is very difficult to develop a fair
method for determining who is a good teacher. Probably the best
method would be a value-added approach which tested students
before they came to the teacher, developed measures of how much
they were expected to learn, and then rewarded those teachers whose
students learned more than predicted. To be an accurate gauge of the
teacher's ability, such an approach would have to take into account
such factors as the socio-economic mix of the students and the percentage with distracting home problems.
The analogy to capital punishment, I hope, is clear. Determining
which people should get punishment is not unlike determining which
teachers should get merit raises-though of course the stakes are a
great deal higher. We first must decide just what we are looking for,
which generally requires us to think of why we want capital punishment to begin with. Then we will have to decide what kind of errors
we are willing to tolerate and, finally, we must develop a process that
makes the decisions correctly and fairly, without being too
cumbersome.

Il. THE PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Probably the best introduction to this problem is in a fascinating
book called The Death Penalty: A Debate.2 John Conrad, a distinguished penologist who opposes the death penalty, and Ernest van
den Haag, probably the leading American spokesperson in favor of
the death penalty, square off in an interesting and well-balanced debate. Although the book provides an enormous range of dialogue on
capital punishment, I want to focus here on one particular issue-the
problem of deciding whom to execute.
2. E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CoNRAD, THE DETH PENALTY. A DEBATE (1983).
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Professor van den Haag, although advocating the death penalty,
nonetheless acknowledges:
One of the most persuasive arguments against the death penalty is that innocent people may suffer it owing to some mistake. This is an argument squarely based on justice and it objects to a possible injustice. However rare, such miscarriages
of justice are likely to occur. They weaken the argument of
those who would retain capital punishment, who favor the
death penalty for the guilty because it is just. They [the people who favor the death penalty] have to admit that the execution of the guilty necessarily implies the unintended execution of some innocents which is unjust.3
In an interesting response to his own argument, van den Haag
contends:
These miscarriages of justice are irrelevant to the arguments
of the abolitionist, though they seldom realize as much, since
they oppose the death penalty regardless of guilt or innocence.
For abolitionists, all executions are in a sense a miscarriage of
justice regardless of guilt. Hence, whether the man to be
exe4
cuted is guilty of the crime or not becomes irrelevant.
On several grounds van den Haag's argument is too simplistic. An
opponent of capital punishment could well rely on the possibility of
error as the dispositive reason for opposing the death penalty, even
for people who were undeniably guilty. The opponent could argue
that, in view of the frailty of human judgment, there actually were no
such category as "undeniably" guilty. Even if there were such a category, one might nevertheless argue that the possibility of error should
doom the institution of capital punishment-which would thereby
preclude execution even of the undeniably guilty. After all, there is
nothing logically inconsistent with forsaking the death penalty in all
cases because of a combination of two reasons: first, the execution of
an innocent person is so terrible that it must be avoided at all costs;
and, second, the only way we can be sure it isn't done is to execute

nobody.
One might surmise, however, that van den Haag's real answer to
this "possibility of error" argument is different. Indeed, it appears
that van den Haag regards capital punishment, though of course undesirable for the innocent, as not, in the grander scheme of things, so
3. Id. at 55.
4. Id. at 55-56.
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terrible. In response to John Conrad's point that ear cropping and
various mutilations common at the time of the adoption of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments clause would today be rejected by every
civilized person, van den Haag says:
Noting that I find ear-cropping revolting, Professor Conrad
asks if the death penalty is not also revolting, why not? The
answer is simple. We must all die. But we must not have our
ears cropped. Ear cropping is a human invention and it strikes
me as a revolting one. Death is not a human invention and I
find nothing revolting about it. Nor do I find it revolting to
hasten death.'
Of course, hastening death, as every law student knows, is what we
call murder. The "hastening death" argument, as Professor van den
Haag must know, is a weak one. After all, that is all the convict
awaiting execution has done to someone else. It is one thing to argue
the enormous difference between the state's legitimate and the murderer's illegitimate killing; it is quite another to belittle the consequence of killing-death.
A. Execution as Just Another Death
Professor van den Haag's hastening death argument does raise a
crucial issue in the administration of the death penalty. If execution
is just another death, why get so excited about it? After all, if the
resources spent fighting over capital punishment were instead used to
put up traffic signs at dangerous intersections or to improve emergency services, we would, on balance, probably save lives. One could
go further and argue that if opponents of capital punishment really
do not wish the government to take innocent lives, they would better
devote their energies to areas where the government probably takes
more innocent lives than it possibly threatens with capital punishment for murder-such as weakening the safety regulations of toxic
chemicals in the workplace or of automobiles. However, we seem to
accept the idea that the government may behave in ways which, in
the but-for sense, will cause the death of some innocent citizens. If
capital punishment is like any other kind of death, why do we care so
much about it?
One reason why capital punishment is simply not just another
death is that it involves the psychological strain of waiting for and
anticipating one's death. While Professor van den Haag admits this,
he blames the problem on people who object to capital punishment.
5. Id. at 190.
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He states that:
In 1982 there were about 1,000 convicts on death row. Nobody
knows how many of them will actually be executed and who
will be spared after expecting execution for years. Most convicts on death row are kept in conditions far worse than those
imposed on other prisoners. They are isolated in miniscule
cells with nothing to do but wonder about their fate. The cruelty is gratuitous. It is not inherent in the death penalty or in
any way required by it. Rules and practices mandating a reduction and a speed-up of appeals and making sure that persons under death sentences are treated no worse than other
persons confined to prison, are entirely compatible with the
death penalty. Abolitionists and retentionists alike should
favor the elimination of unnecessary cruelty. A person sentenced to death is not sentenced to any additional and gratuitous suffering.6
If van den Haag is distinguishing between the intentional infliction of
this cruelty and the recognition that it will occur, he is probably correct. If he is asserting, however, that in a well-run capital punishment
system this cruelty would not occur, and that persons under death
sentences could be treated no worse than those who die of natural
causes, it seems to me he is flatly wrong.
Someone sentenced to death is sentenced to a very different experience than merely dying. In his Reflections on the Guillotine, Albert
Camus points out that in an effort to do equality between the murderer to be executed and the victim whom he killed, we will almost
inevitably be doing something much worse to the murderer than the
murderer did to his victim. Camus phrases it as follows:
There could not be real justice in such cases unless the murderer having made known his decision months in advance had
entered his victim's house, tied him up securely, informed him
he would be put to death in the next hour and then used this
hour to set up the apparatus by which his victim would be
dispatched. What criminal has ever reduced his victim to a
condition so helpless, so hopeless and so powerless? Such a
monster is not found in private life.7
That Camus' point has some validity is indicated by Justice
6. Id. at 14.
7. A. Carus, Reflections on the Guillotine, printed in
149-50 (1960).
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White's opinion in Godfrey v. Georgia.8 There the issue was whether
a killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
which was one of the aggravating circumstances required for murderers to receive the death penalty under Georgia's capital punishment
statute.9 The enraged defendant had shot his estranged wife through
the window of the trailer where her mother lived. He then entered
the trailer, reloaded his gun, and fatally shot his mother-in-law. The
majority of the Court decided this murder was not "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" and, hence the defendant could
not be executed.
Justice White dissented, arguing that the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." In support of this
conclusion, Justice White pointed to the fact that the defendant's
mother-in-law was forced to stand helpless during the time that the
defendant reloaded his shotgun-a period of less than a minute. In
Justice White's words, the defendant's mother-in-law's "last several
moments as a sentient being must have been as terrifying as the
human mind can imagine." 10
The helpless waiting for an imminent, inevitable death is not the
only aspect of capital punishment which makes it not just another
death. Another distinction is its peculiar on-again-off-again character
resulting from the stays as the defendant's case wends its way
through the courts.1 1 It is interesting that among the worst of the
barbarities inflicted upon our prisoners of war by the North
Vietnamese were the fake executions.1 2 Prisoners were informed that
they had been condemned to death and that the date had been set;
later, they were told the time had come and were prepared for the
firing squad; finally, at the last minute the execution would be
stopped and the prisoners would be returned to their cells. I do not
regard it as very important that the North Vietnamese did this deliberately to cause psychological pain and had no intention of killing
their prisoners, while our authorities are generally doing their best to
get on with the execution. From the viewpoint of James Autry whose
stay of execution was granted while he was strapped down on a
gurney, already receiving the saline injection preparatory to addition
of the drug that was to kill him,3 the distinction between torture and
the slow process of justice is not very important.
8. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 444 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
9. GA. CODE 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
10. 446 U.S. at 449.
11. Caryl Chessman's execution, for example, was stayed eight times over an eleven-year
period, before finally being carried out. M. MACHLIN & W. WOODFIELD, NINTH LIFE 9 (1961).
12. See generally J. DENTON, WHEN HELL WAS IN SESSION (1976).

13.

Thirty-One Minutes From Death, Tim, Oct. 17, 1983, at 52.
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Once we face the realities of inflicting the death penalty, we can
no longer talk of it as just another death. Nor can it be compared
with the kind of death that is probably most feared today-death
from painful cancer. It is true that death from terminal cancer shares
with execution the same sense of inevitability and the same on-againoff-again raising and dashing of hopes, as remission alternates with
recurrence. Even so, physicians tell us that at the end of terminal
illness there is a period of peace. 4 Moreover, in the hospital corridors
14.

Lewis Thomas writes:

We may be able to rediscover that dying is not such a bad thing to do after all. Sir
William Osler . . . disapproved of people who spoke of the agony of death, maintaining
that there was no such thing ...
Judging from what has been found out thus far, from the first generation of people
resuscitated from cardiac standstill (already termed the Lazarus syndrome), Osler seems
to have been right. Those who remember parts or all of their episodes do not recall any
fear or anguish. Several people who remained conscious throughout, while appearing to
have been quite dead, could only describe a remarkable sensation of detachment.
In a recent study of the reaction to dying in patients with obstructive disease of the
lungs, it was concluded that the process was considerably more shattering for the professional observers than the observed. Most of the patients appeared to be preparing themselves with equanimity for death, as though intuitively familiar with the business.
I find myself surprised by the thought that dying is an all-right thing to do, but
perhaps it should not surprise. 'It is, after all, the most ancient and fundamental of biologic functions, with its mechanisms worked out with the same attention to detail, the
same provision for the advantage of the organism, the same abundance of genetic information for guidance through the stages, that we have long since become accustomed to
finding in all the crucial acts of living.

L. THoMAs, THE LivEs

OF A CELL: NoTEs OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 50-51 (1974).
Compare Thomas' benign picture of natural death with the execution of Leanderess Riley
in San Quentin Prison.

At nine-fifty, Associate Warden Rigg and the doctors came in. I told Leanderess to say a
prayer to himself, if he did not care to have me pray, and to relax into God's care. He did
not seem to hear me. When the doctors started to approach his cell, he made a throaty,
gutteral growling sound. Frantically, at random, he picked up some of the old legal papers on his table and began passing them through the bars to the associate warden, as if
they were appeals or writs.
A guard unlocked his cell. He gripped the bars with both hands and began a long,
shrieking cry. . . . The guards grabbed him, wrested him violently away from the bars.
The old shirt and trousers were stripped off. His flailing arms and legs were forced into
the new white shirt and fresh blue denims. The guards needed all their strength to hold
him while the doctor taped the end of the stethoscope in place.
Leanderess had to be carried to the gas chamber, fighting, writhing all the way. As
the witnesses watched in horror, the guards [strapped] him into a chair. . . . They
backed out, slammed the door on him.
Leanderess didn't stop screaming or struggling. Associate Warden Rigg was about to
signal for the dropping of the gas pellets when we all saw Riley's small hands break free
from the straps. He pulled at the other buckles, was about to free himself.
The Associate Warden withheld his signal. . . . He ordered the guards to go in again
and restrap the frenzied man. One of the guards said later he had to cinch the straps
down so tightly the second time that he "was ashamed of himself."
Again the door was closed. Again Leanderess managed to free his small, thin-wristed
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outside the room of the dying, there are grieving relatives rather than
(perhaps in his hearing) gloating crowds demanding that the convict's death come quickly and perhaps painfully. This is hardly just
another death.
Finally, the pain and deprivation of capital punishment falls not
only upon the individual executed, but upon his family and loved
ones as well. This factor alone would guarantee that execution is not
like any other death. Of course we must not idealize the subject of
capital punishment. Often his departure will be regretted by no one.
He will have worn out the patience of those around him just as he
has worn out society's.
Nonetheless, surprisingly many of those on death row do have
those who are deeply attached to them, be it a mother, a wife or children. The death of a loved one will not only be their loss but they
also will bear the stigma of the means of his death. Of course this loss
and stigma are to some extent regrettable parts of any imprisonment
as well as execution. Nonetheless, these concededly innocent people
suffer from the death penalty in a way unlike those within the penumbra of any other kind of death.
One might respond to the argument that capital punishment is
not just another death by arguing that the defendant is guilty and,
hence, should suffer. Moreover, the defendant must suffer to support
the valid purposes, such as retribution and deterrence, for which we
maintain capital punishment. Thus, a proponent of the death penalty
will take the view that although the death penalty may be "vile, horrible or inhuman," the reasons for it outweigh this disadvantage.
The point here is, however, that whether or not the pains of capital punishment are properly inflicted upon those persons who are
guilty, the infliction of such a death on somebody who is innocent
should be avoided at considerable cost. Indeed, it can be argued that
if the person to be executed is in fact innocent, the pain inflicted is
even greater since his sense of injustice will add to his agony. In addition, as the innocent man is executed, he must know that his and his
family's stigma is likely never to be erased. With his death, the incentive to prove him innocent, the means of doing so through legal
processes, and perhaps even the crucial knowledge necessary to do
right hand from the straps. Riggs gave the order to drop the pellets. Working furiously,

Leanderess freed his left hand. The chest strap came off next. Still shreiking and moaning, he was working on the waist strap when the gas hit him. He put both hands over his
face to hold it away. Then his hands fell, his head arched back. His eyes remained open.
His heart beat continued to register for two minutes, but his shrieking stopped and his
head slowly dropped.
B. EsHELAN

& F. RxrEy, DEATH Row CHLmN 160-61 (1962).
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this, may all disappear.
Of course, one may say that all this is fanciful and that no innocent people have in fact been executed. It is true that in the modern
history of the death penalty, the last thirty-some years, probably no
innocent person has been executed. Nevertheless, a number of people
convicted and sentenced to death subsequently have been determined to be innocent, plucked off death row, and released. 15 Although I cannot prove it, my guess is there are other innocents presently on death row whom we do not yet know about. Nonetheless, so
long as only five or six people are executed each year, it may well be
that none of them will be innocent. When we execute many more,
even an adherent of capital punishment, such as Professor van den
Haag, is willing to acknowledge that some will be innocent.
B. The Meaning of Innocence
Up to now, we have considered the innocent person a victim of
mistaken identity who had nothing to do with the killing. Innocence,
however, may be much more complex and ambiguous than this.
Those who have killed in self-defense or by accident without negligence, or who have a valid necessity, duress, or insanity defense are
all innocent under our law. Considering these types of innocence as
well as the prototypical innocent victim of mistaken identification, it
can no longer be said with the same confidence that we have executed only the guilty in recent history. Indeed those familiar with the
accuracy of our criminal process would not dismiss the high likelihood that some of those already executed were "innocent."' 16
If we regard as innocence merely innocence of a capital crime, despite guilt of a lesser crime, the chances of executing somebody who
17
is innocent go up very sharply. Indeed, as I have written elsewhere,
I am convinced that the first involuntary execution in the United
States since the long moratorium was in this category. John Spinkellink had killed a man in what appreared to be a classic case of voluntary manslaughter, as his victim had homosexually assaulted him earlier. 18 Although Spinkelink was not the ideal candidate for
15.

These cases make dramatic reading and have provided material for a number of
THE INNOCENTS (1964); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GunIrv (1957).
16. Nor can we take much comfort from the fact that the mistaken rejection of a defense
(including a "defense" of accident) is somehow something of little importance. Each defense
exists in the law for reasons. All result from conclusions that certain kinds of behavior are
morally innocent and should not be criminally punished. It is one thing to question these conclusions-though I would maintain that, on examination, each of them would survive such scrutiny-it is another thing to keep the defenses but regard them as somehow of little moment.
17. Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 555, 576 (1983).
18. The dead man also had robbed Spinkellink of his money, had forced him to play

books. See, e.g., E. RADIN,
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execution, his case was at the top of the pile when it suddenly became clear that Florida could proceed with executions. Since all the
proceedings had essentially been completed, it would have taken special fortitude for a court to postpone any execution until a much better candidate was ready.
Obviously, executing somebody who, like Spinkellink, was innocent of a capital offense but nonetheless criminally killed someone, is
not the same as executing someone who is innocent of any crime. We
depart even more from our ultimate fear of executing someone completely innocent when we execute someone who is guilty of murder
but lacks the aggravating circumstances required by law. Yet, we
need not accept the abolitionist argument that the death penalty is
too terrible to inflict on anyone to agree that it is too terrible to do to
all but the very most guilty. Otherwise, the injustice we do will be in
proportion to the disparity between the death penalty and the defendant's crime. This disparity may be both extreme and, because of
publicity and attention usually given to capital punishment, widely
appreciated. I discerned a kind of embarrassment with the result of
the Spinkellink case, even among those in Florida who heartily endorse the concept of capital punishment.
A more pragmatic consideration may be that even under present
standards, many more candidates are eligible for execution than we
seem prepared to execute. The number of murders and non-negligent
homicides in the United States today is 22,000 a year.19 The total
number of people who have been executed in the last 15 years or so is
less than a dozen. 20 Although the current, less restrictive, Supreme
Court rules may facilitate application of the death penalty, I doubt
very strongly we will ever exceed the 200 executions that took place
in 1935.21 And even 200 out of 22,000 leaves us with a problem of
selection far more difficult than the state of Florida faces in selecting
good teachers. Thus the execution of those who should not be executed deprives us of the ability to execute others we regard as more
deserving of the death penalty. Even if ardent partisans of capital
punishment concede there are more candidates for the death penalty
than space available, they no doubt wish to reserve that space for
Russian Roulette, and had boasted of murdering a fellow inmate in prison. Spinkellink v. State,
313 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Spenkelink v. Florida, 428 U.S. 911
(1976).
19. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE
UNrrED STATES, 1980 12 (1981).
20. As of April 5, 1984, 18 persons had been executed. Executions Since 1976, The Peninsula Times-Tribune, Apr. 5, 1984, at A-8, col. 1.
21. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 1981,
AT 8 (1983).
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those who have committed the most aggravated killings.
The process of selecting those who are most deserving of capital
punishment should be taken very seriously. Because capital cases are
highly publicized, if errors are revealed it will be much harder to persuade the public that the criminal justice system, in general, reaches
the right results. Execution of the innocent can be expected to have
the widest impact, casting not only capital punishment but the entire
criminal justice system into doubt. Errors involving the degree of the
crime or the presence or absence of aggravating factors may also corrode public confidence in the system.
C. Avoidance of Arbitrariness
The capital verdict has consequences beyond resource allocation
and producing justice. In adjudicating who should receive the death
penalty, both the procedures used and the results produced should
advance our moral values. Even if capital punishment verdicts cannot
be said to be wrong, they should not be arbitrary either. Arbitrariness, in the sense of inequality, is a serious problem in the administration of capital punishment.
Part of the problem arises because recommending the death penalty is fundamentally different from usual decisions the jury must
make. Generally, the finder of fact is asked to decide questions such
as "was it the defendant who killed" and "what was his state of mind
at the time." In capital cases, however, conviction of murder does not
end the matter. The finder of fact must then decide not only whether
there are aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but whether, on
balance, the former outweigh the latter." This is really asking the
jury for its opinion, rather than for a decision as to facts. In other
words, the jury is asked to decide whether this person deserves to die
for his crime.
As Professor Charles Black has persuasively pointed out,2 3 the
real problem is not that, as the issue becomes more and more indefinite, the jury will more likely get it wrong. 4 As the standards become
less clear, it is harder to speak of deciding the question wrongly.
22. Cf., e.g., GA. CODE 26-3102 (1983) (jury must find at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance in order to impose death penalty; no requirement to weigh mitigating against
aggravating circumstances); TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1981) (jury
must unanimously find that the defendant acted deliberately, that the defendant would continue to threaten society in future, and the defendant did not kill in response to the victim's
provocation).
23. C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
24. It is hard to imagine circumstances which could show that the jury misweighed aggravating and mitigating factors in the same way we can conceive of evidence appearing which
would show the defendant to have been innocent.
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Rather, the problem becomes one of arbitrariness. To have similar
cases decided differently or to have less serious cases involve harsher
punishment than more serious ones not only wastes our resources but
offends odr values as well.
The problem is compounded by the procedural methods used to
decide capital cases. It would be hard to devise a procedure more
likely to produce arbitrariness than the one actually used in capital
cases. Although the jury is necessary to bring the conscience of the
community to bear upon an essentially moral problem, juries vary in
their outlook not only from county to county but from panel to
panel. Moreover, the judge's degree of control over the jury in capital
cases is probably even less than that in civil cases.
One factor contributing to inconsistent capital verdicts may be
worse than the randomness resulting from arbitrariness: namely, the

race of the victim.2 5 At one time, reasons apart from race were prof-

fered to explain why those who killed blacks were less likely to receive a death sentence than those who killed whites. It was argued
that, for complex social reasons, killings of white victims were more
likely to be the result of a "stranger-crime," an associated felony such
as robbery, the use of a deadly weapon, or a case involving multiple
victims. Even if these variables are held constant, there remains an
enormous discrimination between those who kill whites and those
who kill blacks. A defendant, black or white, who kills a white person
is approximately four times as likely to receive a death sentence as a
similar criminal whose victim is black.26
This kind of arbitrariness will be very difficult to halt. Nevertheless, until we do, our processes will be making a statement about the
value of different kinds of human life-a statement which is an affront to our values of racial equality. Undoubtedly, there will be
strong pressure for legal rules to reduce this kind of arbitrariness.
Yet, the kind of legal rules necessary will be complicated to administer and will probably have to be retroactive as well.
In addition to our values of racial equality, other important values
are at stake in capital punishment adjudications as well. The dignity
of the individual is defended by the privilege against self-incrimination, search and seizure rules, and also perhaps by the right to counsel. The value of fairness is also implicated by'the right to an unbiased jury and by the right to counsel, which gives the poor the same
legal service that would be available to the rich. Capital cases are
clearly no place to compromise and economize our values. If we take
25. See generally Gross & Mauro, Patternsof Death:An Analysis of Racial Disparities
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, - STAN. L. REv.
- (1984).
26. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 1
[Vol. XXXVI

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

these values of fairness, the dignity of the individual and racial
equality seriously, the place to reaffirm them is where the stakes are
highest.
D. The Appellate Process: Delaying the Moment of Reckoning
Although there are many reasons to be careful in capital cases,
they do not explain fully why such cases take so much time to litigate. Part of the reason is a vicious circle. In Professor van den
Haag's view, capital punishment is less humane than it should be because of the drawn-out litigation. This lack of humanity, however,
makes it even more important not to subject the wrong people to the
process, which in turn requires more care from the courts that this
does not happen, and a longer delay.
Proponents of capital -punishment may argue that reducing appellate delay insures a more humanitarian process. Hence, if delays
could be further reduced, more people could be executed. Yet the
long time on death row and the on-again-off-again nature of the appellate process are only two aspects of capital punishment which impel us toward great care.
Because the stakes are so high in capital cases, we will necessarily
have rules designed both to minimize error and to advance our values.2 7 Often a case arises where we think the defendant deserves to
be sentenced to death, but where some legal rule was not followed at
his trial. There are good reasons to insist on obeying the rules anyway. One is that the rules generally are better methods of preventing
mistakes even than our certainty that we are correct; another is that
strict adherence to the rules in "clear cases" insures that they are
more likely to be followed in other cases. If appellate courts do not
insist that the rules be followed, they will gradually erode safeguards
that have been erected to protect innocent people from execution and
to defend our values.
The appellate process is often strung out because public demand
for the death penalty in certain cases is so great that foolish things
are done, which may require years to straighten out. Take the case of
Caryl Chessman who staved off his execution for fourteen years, and
cost the State of California (in present day dollars) over a million
dollars to execute him. His main claim (which was factually correct)
was that the court reporter had died before transcribing two-thirds of
his notes. After the notes proved undecipherable by the other official
reporters, the prosecutor called upon his "close relative," a former
27. See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 909-10 (1982)
(estimating that approximately 2,000 persons have been executed without appeal since 1864).
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court reporter, to complete the transcript. 28 On appeal, Caryl Chessman was denied a hearing to question whether the final transcript
was correct or not. The California Appellate Court, the California Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit all were so intent on ridding society of Caryl
Chessman that it took the United States Supreme Court to say that
the least one could do is listen to Chessman and see whether there
were problems with the trial transcripts produced by the prosecutor's
relative.29 Seemingly, this step could have been taken years and many
appeals earlier, but apparently the impatience of prosecutors and
judges obscured their acumen.
Interestingly, it may be that this eagerness to hasten execution
will be reduced as we execute more people. If so, appellate delay
could actually be reduced because there will be fewer cases taking
appeals to rectify situations which could be resolved the first time
around.
In any event, it is fairly clear that the United States Supreme
Court is going to interfere with fewer and fewer executions.3 0 I think
the Court's attitude is getting very much like its attitude on pornography. They tried to establish standards whereby some things which
might be labeled pornography were protected by the first amendment
and some were not. It turned out that self-operating standards did
not exist and the Justices found themselves watching many more
dirty movies than they anticipated, so they simply got out of the
business.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although a solid majority of Americans favor capital punishment,:" it may be that we have become accustomed to executing so
few people that we will never accept the executions of many more. If
28. The former court reporter was the prosecutor's wife's cousin. Application of Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 391, 398, 274 P.2d 645, 649 (1954). Chessman claimed, in fact, that the prosecu-

tor had dictated a fictitious transcript that deliberately omitted prejudicial errors occurring at
the trial. In re Chessman, 43 Cal. 2d 408, 408-11, 274 P.2d 655, 655-57 (1955).

29. People v. Chessman; 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950), aff'd on rehearing,38 Cal.
2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951), habeas corpus denied sub nom. In re Chessman, 128 F. Supp. 600
(1955), aff'd sub nom., Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 3 (1955).
30. Certainly this is how most death penalty opponents have viewed the Court's recent
decisions. See, e.g., J. GoRECKI, CAP TAL PUNISNmENT. CRMINAL LAW ND SOCIAL EVOLUTION
(1983); S. DmE, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT INTHE UNITED STATES: A CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE
13-29, 52-72 (1983).
31. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, SouncEBOOK OF CRIMNAL
JUSTI E STATTIS-cs-1982 263 (1983) finds 66% of those questioned favor capital punishment
for murder, while 28% oppose and 7% have no opinion (based on data provided by National
Opinion Research Center in 1980).
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so, the economies of scale in capital punishment will be denied. The
inefficiency and unfairness inherent in the current application of the
death penalty will continue. Our choice will be whether the problem
of administration is weighty enough, when considered with the abolitionists' other arguments, to outweigh the claims of those who wish
to retain and enlarge upon capital punishment.
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